Abstract--This paper proposes a novel remote user authentication scheme using smart cards which allows both the authentication server (AS) and the user to verify each other's authenticity. Our scheme is efficient enough to resist the known attacks that could be launched against remote user authentication process.
remote user authentication process using smart cards.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We use LU decomposition [7] for our scheme. LU decomposition is a procedure for decomposing a square (2) According to the definition, elementary matrix E is an N × N matrix if it can be obtained from the identity matrix I n by using one and only one elementary row operation (e.g., elimination, scaling, or interchange) [8] , [10] . Elementary row operations are,
. If the elementary matrices corresponding to the row operations that we use are,
IV. OUR BILATERAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME

A. Pre-processing -Symmetric Matrix Creation
At first, a secret symmetric key matrix A (dimension N N × ) is generated by the AS, where N is the maximum number of users that could be supported. Each element A ij of A is assigned a distinct key from a key pool (generated earlier) such that, A ij = A ji for, i, j = N , 1 . Then, LU-decomposition is applied on the matrix A to get L and U.
B. Details of Our Scheme
Our scheme has mainly two phases -User Registration Phase, Login & Bilateral Authentication Phase.
User Registration Phase: We assume that, this phase occurs over a secure channel. Let F h be a secure one-way hash function [9] . In the registration phase, the user U a with identity ID a first submits his identity (ID a ) and arbitrarily chosen password PW a to the AS for registration. In turn the AS does the following steps:
1. Generates two random numbers x and y within the range N (the dimension of the matrices). 2. It selects the xth row from L matrix L R (x), xth column from U matrix U C (x), and yth column from U matrix U C (y).
3. Computes L R (x) × U C (y)=K xy and θ=F h (ID a ⊕ K xy )⊕PW a 4. Issues a smart card containing (F h , K xy , ν, U C (x), θ), to the user, where ν = ( y φ ⊕ ) with ϕ is an arbitrary number which is kept secret and owned by the authentication server.
Login & Bilateral Authentication Phase: When the user needs to login, he attaches the smart card to the input device and keys in his identity ID a and password PW a . The smart card performs the following operations:
1. Generates a random number r with the same length of K xy and computes H a = K xy ⊕ F h (r), and S a = θ ⊕ PW a ⊕ r.
2. Sends the login request message, M = (ID a , H a , ν, U C (x), S a , T), (here, T is the current timestamp) to the AS.
After getting M, the AS performs the operations: 1. Checks the validity of ID a . If the format is different than the allowed format, it rejects the request.
2. Tests the time interval (T′ -T) ≤ ΔT, where T′ is the timestamp of receiving the message M and ΔT is the maximum allowed time interval for transmission delay. If ΔT is greater than its boundary condition, the request is rejected.
3. Now AS computes, ( φ ⊕ ν ) which eventually generates the value of y. AS now knows which row is to be selected from the L matrix for this user and selects the yth row L R (y) and computes, L R (y) × U C (x) = K yx 4. Computes t = F h (ID a ⊕ K yx ), and r′ = t ⊕ S a . 5. Computes, H a ⊕ F h (r′), which is expected to generate the value of K xy for a legitimate user, as r′ should be equal to the randomly generated number in the user side, r.
6. Now the server checks whether the condition, K xy = K yx holds or not. If it does not hold, the server detects the user U a as an invalid user otherwise as a valid user. For the invalid users, the server rejects the login request and for the legitimate users, it proceeds to the next steps.
7. Computes M′ = F h (K yx X-NOR T′′), where T′′ is the current timestamp, X-NOR means the bitwise Exclusive-NOR (XNOR) operation and sends (M′, T′′) to the user U a .
Upon receiving this message from the AS, the user U a , 1. Verifies the boundary condition, T′′′-T′′ ≤ ΔT, where T′′′ is the timestamp of receiving the message.
2. Then it computes, F h (K xy X-NOR T′′) and if it equals to the received M′, the user verifies the legitimacy of the AS.
As a symmetric matrix is used for LU-decomposition, K xy =K yx and the procedure works for the legitimate authentication server and user. Thus, we ensure bilateral verification in our scheme.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze our scheme in brief. Replay Attacks: Replaying an old login request, (ID a , H a , ν, U C (x), S a , T) could not do any harm as, in the second step of the login & authentication phase in the AS, this will be rejected.
Masquerade Attack: Our scheme is resistant to masquerading attack presented in [3] as, our algorithm does not derive any password based on the identity of the user, rather it is chosen by the user and an attacker must have prestored other information to masquerade a legitimate user.
Eavesdropping: By eavesdropping, an attacker could get little information that could be useful. In fact, even if the attacker knows U c (x), without knowing the corresponding row information or other information, it could not do any harm.
Forging Attack: No attacker could forge a valid login request as it will be detected by the AS during the authentication process.
Other Attacks: Offline and online password guessing attacks and parallel session attacks mentioned in [5] could not be performed against our scheme as the bilateral authentication depends on some pre-stored information.
As in each step different message formats are used, the attacker cannot take advantage of similar previous message to use it in any later step. No attacker can compute the hash outputs as F h is a one-way hash function and it is kept secret. ϕ is used for hiding the required row number even from the user and provides effective security for our algorithm. There is no exponential operation in our scheme; hence, the computation is fairly easy. For supporting more users, multiple symmetric matrices could be used.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel remote user authentication scheme using smart cards which ensures bilateral authentication so that both the parties participating in the process could verify each other's validity.
